Кафедра політології
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Browsing Кафедра політології by Author "Kuzio, Taras"
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Item Russia and the Anti-Western Axis Must be Militarily Defeated: Shifting the Western consensus toward ending Russia's military threat to Ukraine and the West(2023) Kuzio, TarasThe new Cold War pits a Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis against the West. The goal of this anti-Western axis is the defeat of the US-led unipolar world that has been in place since the end of World War II. Hamas’ recent brutal terrorist attack against Israel, and Iran’s subsequent threats of regional escalation, have brought home the strategic necessity of Western democracies standing together with the clear goal of the military defeat of the anti-Western axis. This wider threat makes it more important than ever to deliver a decisive defeat against Russia, one of the leading members of this new anti-Western axis. This paper argues that the Western doves approach of drip-feeding military assistance to Ukraine, including by the US, has been wrong and has led to higher civilian and military casualties, more destruction, and the slow pace of Ukraine’s on-going counter-offensive. It further argues that the West should stand united in its support for Ukraine’s military victory and Russia’s military defeat. Such a defeat is practical and would deliver a humiliating defeat to the forces currently promoting global disorder. It would also allow the West to turn its focus to the larger strategic threat of China, as well as the renewed threat posed by Iran. It is evident that Ukraine and Israel, two states under threat of extinction by Russia and Iran respectively, are now battlegrounds in the war launched by the anti-Western axis against the Western order. Russia’s military defeat is understood as Ukraine’s liberation, with Western assistance, of all its territories occupied by Russia since 2014. It is to be acknowledged that Crimea’s liberation and re-integration will be the most challenging aspect for Ukraine. This paper argues that, irrespective of nuclear threats in the Russian media and issued by some Russian politicians, the threat of nuclear escalation is low and has been de-escalated under pressure from China. In backing Russia’s military defeat, the West should support: 1. restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity; 2. resisting ‘land for peace’ negotiations; 3. deterring future Russian invasions and wars by providing Ukraine with NATO membership; 4. transferring frozen Russian assets to Ukraine for the rebuilding of the country; 5. pursuing war crimes trials of Russian political leaders, experts and journalists who supported the invasion and war and promoted genocidal discourse; and 6. supporting the transformation of Russia into a post-imperial democracy that is no longer a threat to its neighbours and at war with the West. Although the West cannot state this as one of its goals, Ukraine’s liberation of its territory through Russia’s military defeat will lead to regime change in Russia as it is inconceivable President Vladimir Putin could remain in power after leading his country to a disastrous defeat. A post-Putin Russia would not automatically lead to a more nationalistic regime; in fact, Russian military defeats in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries following the Crimean war, Russian-Japanese war, and World War I have historically led to reforms and liberalisation. Military defeat could also lead to the fracturing of the Russian Federation with a return to the failed, dysfunctional state of the 1990s with national minorities clamouring for greater autonomy and sovereignty and in some cases independence. A growing number of commentators have welcomed a potential disintegration of the Russian Federation for two reasons. The first because it would represent the end of Russian military expansionism and the second because a smaller Russian nation-state would facilitate democratisation.Item Russia-GUAM-US triangle of competition over Eurasia and geopolitical pluralism(2021) Kuzio, TarasThis article discusses the triangle of competition between Russia and the USA over three members of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, GUAM: Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine. The first of three sections analyze how Russian leaders and politicians have, since 1991, prioritized the reintegration of the former Soviet space over nation-building in the Russian Federation. Russian officials and politicians have always viewed the former USSR, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eurasia as "Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence". Russia has supported separatism and manufactured frozen conflicts, recognized the "independence" of separatist regions, and annexed neighbouring territories in countries that have stepped in a direction contrary to Russia’s regional interests in Eurasia. The second section focuses on Ukraine and GUAM members Azerbaijan and Georgia, which have prioritized building nation states over joining integration projects in the post-Soviet space and have implemented independent or pro-Western security policies. The third section analyses US security policy towards Eurasia and the South Caucasus under assertive (Bill Clinton, George W. Bush) and indifferent (Baack Obama, Donald Trump) presidents. This section discusses policies that US President Joseph Biden could pursue to revive the US as a security actor in partnership with Turkey towards Eurasia and the South Caucasus in pursuit of what US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski described as "geopolitical pluralism" in Eurasia.Item Russophilism and Misunderstanding Ukraine : Review(2024) Kuzio, TarasThis critical review focuses on two new books published by Western scholars that continue to misrepresent Ukraine. Olga Onukh and Henry Gale adhere to the common misconception of Ukrainian politics as divided into "civic" and "ethnic" or "nationalist" and "pro-Russian" presidents. The negative label "ethnic" and "nationalist" is applied only to the center-right Ukrainian politics, which is merged with the nationalists into one group. East Slavic nationalism promoted by the Soviet regime, Russia and pro-Russian forces in Ukraine such as the Party of Regions is not taken into account. Steven Shulman provides a better structure of Ukrainian politics with competition between supporters of "ethnic Ukrainian" and "East Slavic" identities. Using Shulman's structure, we see that there is little difference between Presidents Volodymyr Zelensky and Petro Poroshenko. Onukh and Gale's basic concept that "civic" Zelensky is better than "ethnic" Poroshenko is undermined by theory, a comparative understanding of nation-states and their politics. Dominique Arel and Jesse Driscoll describe the 2014-2021 conflict in Ukraine as a "civil war", strikingly echoing Russian disinformation and the writings of Russophiles in the West. Arel and Driscoll's arguments are weakened by their selective use of Ukrainian, Russian, and Western sources (for example, very few Ukrainian opinion polls are used), the lack of field research in southeastern Ukraine, and the exaggeration of the importance of language in the identity of most Ukrainians. They do not adequately explain why the "Russian Spring" failed in six out of eight southeastern regions of Ukraine and only partially succeeded in Donbas. . Due to their poor understanding of the concept of Russian hybrid warfare, they ignore many examples of Russian intervention other than military aggression (such as disinformation, cyberwarfare, Russian political tourists posing as Ukrainians, Russian intelligence subversion, Russian artillery shelling Ukraine, and Kadyrov's forces ), which existed before the Russian invasion in August 2014.